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ABSTRACT: The article provides a critical analysis of some of the most pertinent philo-
sophical problems of neurotheology. Neurotheology is one of the most recent and 
arguably the most controversial neuro(sub)discipline that purports to account for, 
or at least shed light on, the phenomenon of religion in neuroscientific terms. Fol-
lowing a very brief overview of this newly emerging (neuro)scientific discipline, two 
major philosophical issues are presented: the explanatory vacuity of neurotheological 
accounts and the inability to reflect upon, and therefore draw appropriate implica-
tions from, their epistemological and metaphysical commitments. It will be argued 
that both issues are at least partially dependant on the so-called modular hypothesis 
which has been uncritically accepted by most authors in the field and still plays a 
major role in neuroscience as such. At the closing of the article, some very general 
suggestions for an alternative approach to the study of religious experience are put 
forward, drawing on two complementary and interrelated approaches to conscious-
ness and cognition, namely neurophenomenology and the “4EA models”.
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0. Setting the Scene: The Spectre of Neuroscientific Revolution
In the 1990s, an unexpected, and what soon seemed like an almost unlim-
ited, research potential was unleashed in the field of consciousness studies. 
The so-called “neuroscientific revolution”1 (Lynch 2009), instigated prima-
1 Recently, some authors (e.g. Choudhury and Slaby 2012b) have questioned the talk of 
a “neurorevolution”, suggesting that “the breathless convictions that within a few years … the 
brain sciences will … begin to supersede social, cultural, philosophical, political, literary, or 
other ‘folk’ explanations of behavioral phenomena” are exaggerated and speculative. Instead of 
focusing solely on specific prophecies and promises made by neuroscientists, scholars should 
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rily by the emergence of new imaging techniques (fMRI, PET, SPECT, etc.), 
opened up a rich and colourful world of the living human brain. Techno-
logical innovations enabled real-time study of neurobiological correlates of a 
wide array of mental processes, making phenomena that had been tradition-
ally relegated to the realm of humanities amenable to methods of natural 
sciences. The prospect of being able to determine the neurobiological under-
pinnings of mental phenomena (e.g. decision-making, volition, belief-forma-
tion, emotions, etc.) attracted experts from different scientific backgrounds 
who were hoping that the newly acquired knowledge might perhaps shed 
light on some of the intractable difficulties in their own area of research. 
Thus, over the past twenty years we have borne witness to a proliferation of 
different neuro(sub)disciplines: from the already traditional neuropsychol-
ogy and neuropsychiatry to such curiosities as neuroeconomics, neuroethics, 
neurohistory, neurophilosophy and even neurotheology. “Neurotalk” (Illes et 
al. 2010) has been – slowly, but surely – seeping not only into humanities and 
social sciences2, but also into the crooks and crevices of our everyday lives.
But it was not long before several authors started voicing their concerns 
about methodological and explanatory strategies promulgated by the bur-
geoning field of neuroscience. Some of its far-reaching claims and interpreta-
tions, along with its methods of collecting, organizing and interpreting data, 
were subjected to fierce criticism from philosophical, ethical, sociological and 
historical perspectives (Bennett and Hacker 2003; Choudry and Slaby 2012a; 
Satel and Lilienfeld 2013; Tallis 2011; Uttal 2001). The problem seems es-
pecially pertinent in the case of newly emerging neuro(sub)disciplines that 
have set out to provide neuroscientific accounts of very complex human phe-
nomena, e.g. ethics, politics, religion, etc. It has become increasingly obvious 
that it is far from clear what the bright and colourful brain images actually 
do and can tell us about moral belief, political decision-making and religious 
experience, and that therefore a better understanding of conceptual, method-
ological, epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions of neuroscience 
is needed.
This article provides a critical analysis of one of the most recent and 
arguably the most controversial neuro(sub)discipline, namely neurotheology 
also critically engage with “the assumptions and visions of neuroscience on which such [future] 
scenarios are built”, as these are equally, if not more important in elucidating the reasons why 
neuroscience has gained such widespread recognition in the academic circles and the mecha-
nisms that have enabled it to exert such influence on media and popular culture (ibid.: 5–7).
2 The unrelenting trend towards the “neurologization of humanities” prompted Ray-
mond Tallis’ sarcastic, yet a not wholly unfounded remark: “If you want to understand people, 
look at their brains. The writing is on the wall and the script is pixels on a brain scan. Roll 
over, social sciences and humanities, allow yourselves to be incorporated into a vastly extended 
neuroscience and discover your true nature as animalities” (Tallis 2011: 59).
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(Joseph 2003; Newberg 2010b; Vörös 2013b: chapter 2). But what might 
seem like an eccentric exercise in (neuro)philosophy is not a goal in itself, 
as the overall aim of the article is much broader in scope: namely, by de-
lineating some of the particular philosophical pitfalls that so many advo-
cates of neurotheology have fallen prey to, it purports to show how not to do 
(neuro)science in general. In other words, the blunders of neurotheology can 
be instructive for both neuroscience as such, as well as for prospective new 
neuro(sub)disciplines.
The article consists of five parts. After a very brief overview of the newly 
emerging field of neurotheology in the first section, I present two major 
philosophical issues that loom large in most neurotheological accounts: the 
explanatory vacuity of neurotheological accounts (second section) and the 
blatant inability to reflect upon, and therefore draw appropriate implications 
from, their epistemological and metaphysical commitments (third and fourth 
section). It will be argued that both issues are at least partially dependant on 
the so-called modular hypothesis which has been uncritically accepted by 
most neurotheological authors and still plays a major role in neuroscience 
as such. In the fifth section, I will therefore provide a very brief outline of 
an alternative approach to the study of religious experience, drawing on two 
complementary and interrelated approaches to consciousness and cognition, 
namely neurophenomenology and the 4EA models. It is my contention that, 
as long as neurotheology remains oblivious of its underlying philosophical 
presuppositions, it is bound to remain a pre- or even pseudoscientific endeav-
our, a (to paraphrase Dennett 19873) “neuroscientific bit of physicalist gym-
nastics” with “no methods, no data, no results, no future, no promise” (ibid., 
2001).
1. Neurotheology: God in the Brain or the Brain on God?
So what is this strange scientific discipline called neurotheology?4 Its begin-
nings go back to the 1970’s and 1980’s, but it was only at the end of the 
3 The original phrase “introspectionist bit of mental gymnastics” was, as the reader may 
very well know, aimed against the 1st-person approaches in cognitive science.
4 Not all authors associated with the field accept the proposed neologism. James H. 
Austin, for instance, notes: “’Neurotheology’ has become a buzzword. Fashionable in some 
quarters, it has not entered my lexicon” (Austin 2006: 229). And Newberg exclaims exasperat-
edly, and somewhat surprisingly, given that he was one of the major popularisers of the notion 
(see e.g. d’Aquili and Newberg 1999; Newberg and d’Aquili 2002): “I have never been com-
fortable with the term ‘neurotheology’. This is, of course, a great problem for someone who is 
frequently engaged in the field of neurotheology. There are a variety of reasons for my trepida-
tion. However, my greatest concern has always been the lack of clarity about what neurotheol-
ogy is and what it should try to do as a field. Try as I might to avoid using neurotheology in 
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1990’s that it started gaining more attention – and notoriety – partly due to 
the greater availability of imaging techniques and partly due to fashionable 
catchphrases, such as the “God Machine” (Horgan 2003: 91–105) and the 
“God Part of the Brain” (Alper 2008), that have become associated with it. 
The main goal of neurotheology is to account for, or at least shed light on, 
the phenomenon of religion in neuroscientific terms. If it is namely true that 
all human experience is modulated and processed by the brain, then it seems 
reasonable to suppose that neuroscience is, and must be, the most fundamen-
tal explanatory level for all experiential phenomena, religious phenomena 
included (d’Aquili and Newberg 1999; Newberg and d’Aquili 2002). The 
Archimedean point of neurotheology – the point where the link between em-
pirical and theoretical work ought to be forged – is thus the field of religious 
experience: Since the experiential aspects of religion fall under the purview 
of experimental neuroscience, the field of religious experience seems to be a 
perfect starting point for the account of how religious phenomenology arises 
from neuropsychology (d’Aquili and Newberg 1999). This doesn’t mean that 
neurotheology isn’t interested in other aspects of religion (e.g. rituals, beliefs, 
mythology, etc.), but merely that the research on religious experience seems 
to be backed up by concrete empirical data, which gives it greater authority.
The field of neurotheology is extremely diverse, and there is very lit-
tle, if any, consensus among individual authors on which brain regions are 
implicated in religious experience or how the experimental findings ought to 
be interpreted, to the point that it is doubtful whether there actually exists 
a unified discipline that we might label as “neurotheology”. In the past few 
decades, numerous neurobiological models of religious experience have been 
put forward: from (a) unimodular – right-hemisphere hypothesis (Ornstein 
1972) and temporal-lobe hypothesis (Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998; 
Persinger 1983; Persinger and Healey 2002) – through (b) bimodular – tem-
poral-parietal-lobe hypothesis (d’Aquili and Newberg 1999; Newberg and 
d’Aquili 2002) and temporal-frontal-lobe hypothesis (McNamara 2009) – to 
(c) multimodular or systemic models (Austin 1999, 2006; Beauregard and 
O’Leary 2008). This diversity of neurobiological accounts is matched only 
by an almost equally wide scope of metaphysical commitments embraced 
by their authors: some consider their findings to be compatible with ma-
terialism, be it in a reductionist (Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998; Pers-
inger 1987) or an emergentist flavour (Austin 1999; McNamara 2009), some 
take an explicitly anti-physicalist/materialist stance (Beauregard and O’Leary 
my articles and books, it seems to be something that simply will not go away–at least any more 
than God. While my concerns have continued unabated, I have watched the rest of the world 
continue to use ‘neurotheology’ to describe the field studying the intersection between the 
brain and religion” (Newberg 2010b: ix).
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2008), while others try to sail the noncommittal waters of methodological 
agnosticism (d’Aquili and Newberg 1999; Newberg and d’Aquili 2002).
Neurobiological models of religious experience have been criticised from 
numerous perspectives. In this paper I will focus primarily on their inter-
pretative/explanatory and epistemological/metaphysical shortcomings and 
will leave out theconceptual/phenomenological and methodological/opera-
tive problems, which I have analysed extensively elsewhere (see Vörös 2010; 
Vörös 2012; Vörös 2013b: chapter 2). Suffice it to say that most models are 
severely lacking in phenomenological and conceptual characterization of the 
experience under study (i.e. little or no effort has been made to distinguish 
between different types of religious experience, e.g. visions, locutions, trances, 
mystical experiences, etc., and/or they are uncritically lumped together under 
the vague heading of “religious experience”), and that it is also questionable as 
to what extent the current imaging techniques are actually amenable to, and 
appropriate for, this type of study. Namely, not only are religious experiences 
rare and unpredictable (i.e. impossible to initiate at will), but there are also 
currently no reliable methods of correlating a given experience with a given 
brain activity: on the one hand, the experimenters can’t ask questions during 
the experiments, so it is difficult to determine in retrospect which brain scan 
corresponds to which experience; on the other hand, numerous processes are 
taking place in the brain simultaneously, so it is difficult to establish which 
of the myriads of changes are truly relevant (statistical procedures that are 
normally used in such analyses are not really helpful, as they tend to overlook 
subtle, yet potentially important changes).
2. Circulus vitiosus, or On Explanatory Vacuity
The problem of correlating neurophysiological changes with the relevant ex-
periential changes brings us to our first major issue in this article, namely the 
issue of explanation. For even if it were possible to obtain a relatively well-
defined set of neurobiological correlates of a given experiential state we would 
still have to face the question as to what do these results actually tell us about 
the religious experience in question. The (minimal) finding that the latter is 
– as are, indeed, all other experiences – (at least partially) instantiated in the 
brain seems to be neither particularly interesting nor particularly revealing, 
for this is something that, putting aside a few rare exceptions at the radical 
dualist end of the metaphysical spectrum, would be expected and accepted by 
virtually everyone. But what can neurobiological correlates really tell usabout 
the experience? Why not turn to, say, the level of (neuro)chemistry? The 
intricate interplay between different neurotransmitters seems to play (some) 
role in the experiential alternations, so why not seek the solution there? An-
tonio Damasio brings out the issue poignantly:
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By now everyone knows that the so-called mood-altering drugs turn feelings of 
sadness or inadequacy into those of contentment and confidence. Long before 
the days of Prozac, however, alcohol, narcotics, analgesics, and hormones such 
as estrogens and testosterone, along with a host of psychothropic drugs, have 
shown that feelings can be altered by chemical substances. It is obvious that the 
action of all these chemical compounds is due to the design of their molecules. 
How do these compounds produce their noteworthy effects? The explanation 
usually is that chemical molecules act on certain neurons in certain brain re-
gions to produce a desired result. From the standpoint of neurobiological mech-
anisms, however, these explanations sound a lot like magic. Tristan and Isolde 
drink the love potion; bang, and by the next scene they have fallen in love. It is 
not clear at all why having chemical X attach itself to neurons of brain area Y 
can suspend your anguish and make you feel loving. (Damasio 2003: 120)
But why is it then commonly assumed that the most appropriate explanation 
of the religious experience is to be found at the neurophysiological level? Af-
ter all, it seems that trying to account for experience in terms of an activation 
of a certain brain area is equally, if not even more, akin to (neuro)magic. For 
what is it about neural activation at the level of neural structures that can sup-
posedly help us account for a specific type of experience?
It was mentioned in the previous section that neurotheological models 
differ in their claims about what brain regions are supposed to be implicated 
in the explanation of religious experience. It is possible to depict these differ-
ences in terms of a progressive descent on the modular-systemic scale: on the 
modular top, we find theories claiming that the key role in religious experi-
ence is played by a singular discrete unit (e.g. hemisphere or lobe), whereas 
on the systemic bottom, we find theories that interpret religious experience as 
an intricate interplay between different cortical and subcortical regions. What 
is particularly interesting, is the fact that the explanatory strength of a given 
model seems to be inversely proportional to its complexity. In other words, it 
seems that the anatomically/functionally simplest theories, i.e. theories with 
higher modularity (Ornstein, Ramachandran, Persinger), have greater explan-
atory strength than theories that are anatomically more complex, i.e. theories 
with lesser modularity (Austin, Beauregard). This line of reasoning seems to be 
implicitly presupposed by all neurotheological authors, but is probably most 
evident in Beauregard, who believes that the fact that religious experience is 
accompanied by activity in multiple brain regions implies that the former 
cannot be reduced on, and explained by, the latter. In his view, then, if it 
turns out that the modular theories are false (as purportedly demonstrated by 
his experimental findings), there are good reasons to conclude that religious 
experience cannot be accounted for in neurobiological (physicalist) terms.
But why should this be so? Clearly, the idea that models of lesser com-
plexity have greater explanatory value has no logical support, so why does 
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it seem to enjoy widespread recognition among neurotheological authors? 
I contend that one of the main reasons for its seeming plausibility is the 
hypothesis of the modular structure of the brain, i.e. the idea that individual 
brain regions are highly specialized for the performance of specific cognitive 
functions (Tallis 2011: 22–37). And although the modular hypothesis is of-
ten shunned in theory, it is still heartily embraced by many neuroscientists in 
practice. So, what is the appeal of the modular conception of the brain, and 
why does it seem to hold such great promise for the explanation of experi-
ence? If we assume that specific brain regions are specialized for specific men-
tal functions, then it seems that mental properties of a given experience could 
be analytically explained (away?) by the (say, causal) properties of specific 
brain regions. If, for instance, it turns out that the parietal lobe is responsible 
for the maintenance of the sense of self and the self-positioning in space (e.g. 
d’Aquili and Newberg 1999; Newberg and d’Aquili 2002), then it would 
seem plausible that the experience of ego-death that commonly accompanies 
certain types of religious experiences might be accounted for in terms of the 
deactivation of the parietal lobe. In other words, the modular conception of 
the brain rests on the idea that properties of a given experience are nothing 
but the sum total of properties of brain regions that have been shown to ac-
company this particular experience. And if it turns out that while studying a 
certain religious experience, we stumble across a neural activation pattern that 
is restricted to one or several discrete brain regions (e.g. some sort of “brain 
module” as envisioned by Ramachandran, Persinger or Alper), it would seem 
that this finding, clearly in accordance with the modular hypothesis, is more 
likely to provide a coherent explanation than, say, “a pattern of brain activity 
that is so complex, dispersed and context-dependent as to seem almost incon-
sistent with the neurotheological project” (Norman and Jeeves 2010: 245).
Yet the modularity hypothesis is extremely problematic. The brain is 
namely “a dynamic, functionally integrated, and highly interdependent sys-
tem of complex synaptic-neural networks that interact in non-linear ways”; 
in such a system there are no isolated neural activities, as each individual 
activity, even if it might seem to be distinct from other happenings in the 
brain, is actually a part of an integrated mesh of broader networks of activity 
(Cunningham 2011: 228). Cunningham5provides a comprehensive list of re-
cent neuroscientificfindings that substantiate this claim. First, the seemingly 
discrete brain regions (e.g. the sensory-motor cortex) actually merge with 
other regions. Second, there is a considerable overlap between areas that seem 
to be functionally demarcated (e.g. speech areas). Third, certain brain re-
5 It should be noted that as much as I agree with Cunningham’s criticism of some of the 
unfounded presuppositions of neuroscience, I find his alternative dualist proposal (“the media-
tory brain” hypothesis) unconvincing and metaphysically moot.
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gions (e.g. cerebellum) that were once considered to be involved in only one 
function (e.g. motor coordination) are now known to perform several func-
tions (e.g. substantial cognitive function). Fourth, an organizational princi-
ple called multiplexing offers an account as to how the same neural network 
can perform different functions and different networks can perform similar 
functions. Fifth, the phenomenon of recovery of a function (after a stroke, 
etc.) indicates that dynamical alterations in the localization are possible and 
that the brain can plastically reorganize itself. Sixth, the apparent anatomical 
boundaries are actually functional boundaries, and the individual boundaries 
are capable of changing location (ibid.).
These points, in themselves, pose grave difficulties for the plausibility 
of the modularity hypothesis, but in the background, there looms an even 
greater threat. To get a better grasp of this elusive danger, let us try to recon-
struct how a neuroscientist might come to a conclusion that a certain brain 
region is (allegedly) associated with such-and-such cognitive function. It is 
important to note that her realization wasn’t derived from a careful investiga-
tion of individual brain regions per se, because no region contains intrinsic 
properties that would, in themselves, explain why it is precisely this region 
that plays a key role in precisely this function/state. On the contrary, a neu-
roscientist has come to her conclusion correlatively, i.e. by drawing parallels 
between changes occurring in mental functions/states and the corresponding 
brain damages, changes in neuron activity, etc. Upon collecting a sufficient 
amount of such correspondences, she is then able to draw a conclusion that 
this region is somehow (without knowing how and why; see below) associ-
ated with such-and-such mental state/function. It is true that, once the cor-
respondence has been established, a scientist might retrospectively attempt to 
find (tentative) reasons about how, and why, a given area might contribute to 
a given conscious phenomenon, but such attempts are only possible post fes-
tum, as the brain tissue itself is silent: it is futile to try and guess the function 
of a certain brain region might be if there are no psychophysical indications 
of what that region is supposed to be doing:
Our only knowledge of the functional architecture of the brain stems from the 
collection of reports and behavioral observations with which the measured brain 
activities are correlated. Looking at just the brain reveals nothing interesting to 
cognitive scientist. … The brain areas that have come to be known as “sensory 
areas” have only been recognised as such based on a collection of reports about 
sensations. (Overgaard 2004: 370)
Now, let us ask ourselves what it is we would learn from a finding that a given 
mystical experience M6 is always accompanied by an activation of a certain 
6 Mystical experiences form a unique experiential category that can be roughly character-
ized as follows: “The most prominent characteristic of ‘mystical experience proper’ seems to 
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neural network N and a deactivation of a certain neural network O. Given 
that the function of these two networks has previously been determined on 
the basis of (behavioural or verbal) accounts of mental states accompanying 
N and O, it is unclear what – except for the “stamp of scientific authenticity” 
– the mentioning of the neurobiological level would actually contribute to 
the understanding of M. Let us assume that previous research has shown that 
the experience of ego-loss is accompanied by the deactivation in the circuitry 
O. Since this very same neural pattern – deactivation of O – is then also found 
to be present in M, we might draw the conclusion that M is accompanied by 
the experience of ego-loss, and that the reason for the latter is the deactiva-
tion in the circuitry O. But this is absurd: first of all, the fact that mystical 
experience is accompanied by the loss of self was known in advance, as this is 
one of the phenomenological characteristics that distinguish mystical experi-
ences from other types of religious experiences (e.g. visions or trances) and 
therefore it had to feature in its (operational) definition; and second, how can 
deactivation of O feature as an explanation for the experience of the loss of 
self, if the function of O was determined from previous (verbal, behavioural, 
etc.) accounts of the experience of the loss of self and not from some inherent 
property of O? The only thing that this “explanation” tells us is that mystical 
experiences are accompanied by the deactivation of O whose deactivation 
is accompanied by an experience of the loss of self. In short, instead of an 
explanation, we’re stuck with a tautological snake that is voraciously feasting 
on its own tail.
Many modular neurobiological accounts are therefore not real explana-
tions at all, but mere postulations. To recapitulate: The explanation of mysti-
cal experience is to be found in, say, the right hemisphere or the parietal 
lobe. But what is it about this particular hemisphere or this particular lobe 
that instantiates mystical experience? Why is precisely this lobe associated 
with its experiential features and not some other region, say, the temporal 
lobe? Because it is the parietal and not the temporal lobe that partakes in the 
establishment of the sense of self, and it is well-known that the sense of self 
be the breakdown of the subject-object dichotomy, i.e. of the sense of my being separated from 
the world. This breakdown, where both ‘the self ’ (interiority) and “the world” (exteriority) 
are extinguished or transcended, is normally associated with the experience of oneness and/or 
nothingness, and entails a radical transformation of one’s state and manner of being. [The term 
‘mystical experience’ thus covers] a whole spectrum of experiences distinguished by how this 
subject-object breakdown is realized. On the one end of the spectrum, there are experiences 
of absolute nothingness/oneness, i.e. experiences emptied of all phenomenological content 
(sensations, thoughts, volitions, emotions etc.) in which nothing but pure oneness/nothing-
ness is present; and on the other end of the spectrum we find experiences where this nothing-
ness/oneness is present in and through phenomenological content. Between these two extremes 
lie experiences in which nothingness/oneness is experientially/existentially realized to a lesser 
or greater degree” (Vörös 2013a: 392–393).
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disappears in mystical experience. But how do we know that it is the parietal 
and not the temporal lobe that plays a role in the establishment of the sense 
of self? Because previous clinical and imaging studies have shown that experi-
ential changes in the sense of self are accompanied by changes in activation of 
the parietal lobe. And in what sense can it then be claimed that this actually 
makes up for a neurobiological explanation of mystical experience?
3. From Skull Bumps to Vibrant Images
It thus turns out that the issues of explanation that bedevil neurotheology 
are actually anchored in a set of deeper philosophical problems. As an entry 
point into this next stage of our discussion I propose that we ask ourselves the 
following question: How scientific is neurotheology? Recently, some authors 
(e.g. Dobbs 2005; Kuran 2011; Norman and Jeeves 2010; Tallis 2012; Uttal 
2001) have put forward a seemingly radical claim, namely that all modular 
approaches in neuroscience (neurotheology included) seem to be drifting-
dangerously towards phrenology, a controversial (pseudo)scientific discipline 
from the 19th century. But what exactly is phrenology, and why would some-
one draw parallels between what looks like an obscure (pseudo)scientific en-
deavour and recent neuro(theo)logical models of religious experience, which 
seem to be grounded on solid principles of modern science?
Phrenology was based on three fundamental postulates: (a) the brain is 
the organ of the mind; (b) the functions of the brain are modular, i.e. different 
brain regions are responsible for different mental functions; and (c) precise 
measurements of the skull can reveal the extent to which a given brain module, 
and consequently a corresponding mental faculty, is developed (Tallis 2012: 
33). The main goal of phrenology was thus to relate the so-called “psychol-
ogy of faculties”, which seems to have been the psychological theory of the 
day, with the “current knowledge of the structure of the brain” (Norman 
and Jeeves 2010: 236). For instance, Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828), one 
of the founders of phrenology, believed that mental functions are localized 
in discrete parts of the brain, which he referred to as “organs”, and that each 
of these organs (modules) was a substrate of a particular mental faculty. He 
was also convinced that the functional strength of a given cerebral organ was 
determined by its volume, and that the latter, in turn, determined the cor-
relative size of the bulges and bumps in the region of the skull adjacent to 
a given cerebral organ. Gall thus maintained that, by observing, palpitating 
and measuring the skull, it would be possible to construct a map of brain 
organs that instantiate different psychophysical characteristics (Kuran 2011; 
Simpson 2005).
Why was phrenology discounted as pseudo-science? Contrary to first ap-
pearances, the reason was not so much its methodology, as the fact that it 
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had uncritically transcended its basic theoretical framework and attempted to 
provide answers (explanations) to questions that were out of its bounds. Even 
more importantly, however, all this was done in the name of science: “Because 
phrenology was seen as based on scientific ‘facts’, advocates used this author-
ity to make claims about issues far removed from phrenology” (Norman and 
Jeeves 2010: 236). The modern reader might chuckle upon learning what 
kind of “empirical data” (bumps in the skull, etc.) Gall’s Schädellehre (skull 
reading) used to substantiate its claims with, but we should pause to wonder 
whether the situation will be that different when people living 100 or 150 
years from now are confronted with the findings and methods of contem-
porary neurotheology. Moreover, the nature of empirical data was not the 
primary reason for the downfall of phrenology; far more important were the 
theoretical criteria determining what is to be construed as an empirical datum 
(i.e. the theory of modularity).
At its inception, phrenology was a perfectly legitimate and even very origi-
nal research programme. Its main problem weren’t its theoretical assumptions 
as such – these were formulated as (interesting) hypotheses, which the later 
empirical research might have corroborated or (as it actually happened) in-
validated – but the fact that phrenology, operating under the pretext of “do-
ing strict science”, used these (untested!) assumptions to account for highly 
complex psychological, sociological, cultural and religious aspects of human 
life (from temperament and personality to morality and religion). What 
made phrenology non-scientific and eventually contributed to its progressive 
decline, was therefore not so much the result of the non-“empirical” data that 
it used to substantiate its claims with – in its early stages there was no way 
of telling whether these might prove reliable or not – as the fact that it tried 
to deduce scientific (empirically corroborated) answers to the above-mentioned 
questions from uncorroborated (theoretical) hypotheses. Norman and Jeeves 
draw a similar conclusion:
Phrenologists were happy to point out Gall’s ‘scientific basis’ for phrenology; 
but no one was prepared to explore the discipline in the scientific manner. … It 
is not the case that phrenology was not scientific because it was not experimen-
tal. That misses the point. On the one hand, not all experiments are scientific 
and on the other hand, some descriptive investigations can follow the scientific 
method. (ibid.: 243)
Thus, unlike some authors (e.g. Kuran), who believe that the sole problem of 
phrenology was its reliance on its preferred ways of collecting data (measure-
ments of the skull, etc.), while the idea of modularity itself was “scientifically 
sound” and provided solid foundations for the future development of cog-
nitive (neuro)science (Kuran 2011: 46), our analysis asserts that phrenolo-
gy’s main weakness – that, which eventually contributed to its deterioration 
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from a promising scientific discipline to a naïve philosopheme – was precisely 
the fact that it made use of uncorroborated scientific assumptions to answer 
questions that were obviously beyond its explanatory scope. Phrenology be-
came ideology at the very moment it tried to create an impression that its 
assumptions weren’t speculative, but scientific. And what connects phrenology 
with modern neurotheology, is precisely the (uncorroborated!) assumption of 
modularity:
[A]lthough the ‘bumps on the skull’ idea is no longer with us, the idea that 
mental components exist and that they can be assigned to specific locations 
of the brain very much is. Indeed, the central problem facing cognitive neu-
roscience is how to deal with the unproven assumption that mental processes 
are accessible, separable, and localizable as are the material aspects of the brain. 
(Uttal 2001: 108–109)
The data collecting techniques might have changed – skull measurements have 
been replaced by brain scans – but the basic background assumption remains 
the same, and we have seen this assumption to be empirically and explana-
torily moot. It can therefore perhaps serve as a (dubious) scientific hypothesis, 
but not as a “corroborated fact”, which is why explanations it entails are, 
despite all the flashing imagery produced by brain scanning devices, merely 
presuppositions that are (empirically) suspect and (explanatory) insufficient. 
And this is particularly true of phenomena of such complexity and elusive-
ness as religious experiences:
Modern-day neurotheology runs the risk of following in phrenology’s footsteps. 
No one doubts the mass of empirical data that has been collected relating brain 
activity and various measures of religiosity. The question is whether investiga-
tions of the relationship between brain activity and religious/spiritual activity 
have been scientific. (Norman and Jeeves 2010: 243)
Here, one can but agree with Bradford who, in his critical assessments of 
neurotheology, sees neuroimaging techniques as “a boon” for neuroscience, 
as they confer its claims with “a halo of certainty” (Bradford 2012: 111). Just 
as observations of the skull, measurements of bulges, etc. were used in the 
past to provide phrenology with an aura of “scientific credibility”, so too are 
the modern imaging techniques, such as fMRI, PET or SPECT, all too of-
ten (mis)used and (mis)portrayed by certain members of the neuroscientific 
community to embellish their findings with a “stamp of scientific authentic-
ity”. To caricature: the flashing and flickering of imaging devices is supposed 
to illuminate the observed object (subject’s brain) and thereby enlighten the 
observing subject (experimenter). Yet even if the flashing does, in fact, illu-
minate something, it is not always particularly enlightening; it is namely the 
contention of this paper that, contrary to popular belief, what the flashing 
illuminates is often not the research object itself, but the observer’s unreflected 
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(philosophical) presuppositions that have been unconsciously incorporated 
into the experimental study. In other words, the end result of the imaging 
procedure is not “facts”, but “data” in need of further interpretation. Empiri-
cal findings in themselves are silent; and whoever disdains “metaphysics” and 
demands of empirical findings to speak for themselves, does little more than 
obscure the metaphysical presuppositions on which one’s claims are based. 
There is no neutral position, no Archimedean disembodied point of view that 
would enable us to observe the world from an “impartial” and “objective” 
perspective: every viewpoint presupposes a certain standpoint. The very least 
one can do is to reflect on one’s background presuppositions, “bring them to 
light”, and then either strengthen or abandon them in subsequent academic 
discussions.
It is possible to catch a glimpse of this broad and colourful spectrum of 
background metaphysical presuppositions (from materialist through agnostic 
to dualist) once we consider how phrenologists and “neurotheologians” deal 
with questions about the nature and reliability of religious experience. As 
pointed out by Norman and Jeeves, the theoretical framework of phrenology 
was compatible with a whole spectrum of different metaphysical positions. 
Some phrenologists were convinced that phrenology will “replace” religion, 
some that it will “purify” religion, and others that it will “harmonize” reli-
gion with science. Some maintained that the “soul” was “using the brain”, 
others that it was merely “its manifestation”; some believed “revelation” to 
be “superior” to scientific truths, and some to be its “inferior” (Norman and 
Jeeves 2010: 239). As we have seen above, a similar situation – “the same 
diversity of opinions” – is present in modern neurotheology: some authors 
maintain a “materialist position”, some are “non-materialists”, and others are 
“noncommittal” (ibid.: 243). What all these examples have in common, how-
ever, is the fact that the position taken by an individual author isn’t based 
on empirical findings, but on his or her implicit/background (metaphysical) 
presuppositions, which normally remain unreflected. That is why what might 
have ended up as a potentially interesting scientific discipline turned not only 
into bad science, but also into bad philosophy: instead of promoting a direct 
confrontation between different metaphysical and epistemological positions, 
these disputes continue to wave the flag of naïve “empiricism” and clutch 
uncritically to mutually incommensurable intuitions.
Correlations between mental and neurobiological states are metaphysi-
cally and epistemologically neutral. It is true that, in light of the enormous 
success of modern science, the modular-reductionist physicalist position 
might seem more persuasive, but the question remains metaphysically open. 
This means that alternative (e.g. non-reductionist and emergentist physical-
ist, but also dualist and even idealist) positions are equally compatible with 
experimental data, and that the arena of confrontation between different po-
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sitions is, or should be, the arena of philosophical reflection – as well as the 
arena of lived (embodied) praxis! –regardless of whether this is something that 
the participants in the debate are willing to (explicitly) subscribe to or not. 
In other words, just as turning a blind eye to philosophical presuppositions 
won’t change them into scientific presuppositions, so too will philosophical 
debates between scientists remain just that – philosophical debates. Newberg 
is therefore right in claiming that researchers should opt for methodological 
agnosticism because a “brain scan that demonstrates changes in certain struc-
tures when a nun experiences being in God’s presence could indicate that 
the brain changes created the experience or that the brain was responding 
to the actual experience” (Newberg 2010a: 541). Kuran, on the other hand, 
maintains that such methodological openness is scientifically inacceptable 
(Kuran 2011: 40–41), but fails to realize that what is inacceptable is the fact 
that theories are being spread in the name of science that have actually nothing 
or little to do with science.
4. The Elusive Shrieks of a Bat
These questions have brought us to the greatest problem pestering the idea 
of modularity, whether it be clad in the outdated phrenological or the flashy 
neurotheological attire. It is namely far from clear whether such a theory can, 
in principle, be anything more than speculation, i.e. whether it can ever obtain 
the status of a (scientific?) theory that would truly explain the phenomenon 
under study. Let us return to the problem mentioned in the previous section, 
and assume, for the sake of the argument, that we were able to juxtapose a 
certain religious experience with an activity in a certain brain network.
What exactly would that tell us about how our brain-mind actually accom-
plished their function? … Even if we could find precise modular locations in the 
brain associated with well-defined psychological constructs, we still would not 
have solved the problem of how brain activity becomes mental activity. (Uttal 
2001: 70, 126)
This brings us to the well-known philosophical problem of conscious experi-
ence (Chalmers) or qualia (Jackson), the problem of the notorious explanatory 
gap (Levine) between “conscious” and “physical” phenomena or between the 
“first-person” and “third-person knowledge”. Wherein lies the rub?
One of the more elegant ways of approaching the problem is through 
Thomas Nagel’s famous paper “What it is like to be a bat?” (Nagel 1974). 
Nagel opens his paper with the question of what it means to have conscious 
experience: “[N]o matter how the form may wary, the fact that an organism 
has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is 
like to be that organism” (ibid.: 436). This subjective what-it-is-like character 
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is something that cannot be expressed in objectivist terms, regardless of how 
precise or accurate the latter might be, and is the distinguishing feature of 
all mental phenomena. Nagel underlines his point by inviting the reader to 
consider the experiential world of a bat.
Given that bats are mammals (as are, for instance, cats or dogs), most 
people would probably readily agree that they have conscious experience. 
But having conscious experience entails that there is something it is like to 
be a particular organism (in this case, a bat). Most bats perceive the external 
world by means of a sonar: they emit high-frequency shrieks, detect their 
reflections from objects in range, and then correlate the outgoing signals with 
their echoes, which enables them to (re)construct the distance, height, form, 
movement, and texture of objects (ibid.: 438). The bat sonar provides for a 
special type of perception that is very different from the perception associated 
with our (human) senses. Therefore, there seems to be no reason to assume 
that the experience of a bat is in any way similar to that of a human being. 
For even if I tried to imagine what it would be like to have wings, to have a 
very poor eyesight, and to catch insects at dusk, this would convey only what 
it was like to be me pretending to be a bat (ibid.: 439). The subjective character 
of experience thus consists in nothing else than being the organism experi-
encing this particular subjective character. As conscious beings we are bound 
by our own unique subjectivity: just as nobody else can understand what it 
is it like to be me, so it is impossible for me to experience the subjectivity of 
someone (or something?) else (I can experience only what it would be for me 
to act as this other organism).
Frank Jackson’s thought experiment about Mary the colour scientist re-
volves around a similar point. Mary is a top-notch neuroscientist who knows 
everything there is to know about neurophysiology of colour perception. Yet, 
for whatever reason, she was brought up in a black-and-white environment, 
so she has never actually been exposed to, and has therefore never actually 
seen, real colours. What would happen if Mary decided to leave her black-
and-white room and enter the world of colour? Would Mary learn something 
new about the world or would the knowledge gained during her studies suf-
fice? Jackson is convinced that Mary most definitely would learn something 
new: she would learn what it is like to actually experience certain colour, 
i.e. what is the subjective or qualitative feel of this particular colour. Fac-
tual knowledge cannot exhaust the subjective experience that Mary is bound 
to experience, as it fails to capture qualia (the what-is-it-like feeling) that 
accompany the perception of a colour (Jackson 2002). Joseph Levine has 
put the point eloquently by saying that there is an explanatory gap between 
conscious and brain states: every attempt to account for the former in terms 
of the latter is bound to fail, as there remains a surplus of qualitative charac-
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ter (what-is-it-like, how-does-it-feel) that cannot be explained in physicalist 
terms (Levine 2002).
Chalmers named the problem of (qualitative) experience “the hard prob-
lem of consciousness”:
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When 
we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is 
also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to 
be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for 
example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experi-
ence of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences 
go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the 
smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; 
mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and 
the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states 
is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experi-
ence. (Chalmers 1995: 201)
The question why some organisms have conscious experience – i.e. why the 
information processing in their cognitive systems is accompanied by experi-
ence – remains a mystery:
How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental im-
age, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from 
a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. 
Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems ob-
jectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. (ibid.)
No matter how exact or thorough our knowledge of a brain state B that 
accompanies an experiential state E, it will fail to provide a satisfactory ex-
planation as to why E is the way it is or why B is even accompanied by E. In 
other words, the correlates between neurobiological and experiential states, in 
themselves, tell us nothing about how these states are mutually interrelated, 
so the nature of this relationship is not a scientific, but a metaphysical ques-
tion. What is more, it is one of the most important questions that all monist 
theories of mind have to face.
5. A Way Forward?
So, where does this leave us? Are all neurobiological approaches to religion 
and religious experience destined to fail? Not necessarily. Note that the main 
reason why current neurotheological models are unsuccessful is not the com-
plexity of their research object, but the inadequacy of their research methods, 
i.e. it is not so much about what they try to explain, as it is about how they go 
about doing it. The domain of religious experience is undoubtedly extremely 
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complex and beset with numerous perils, but this doesn’t mean it is intrac-
table in principle: should appropriate phenomenological and hermeneutical 
analyses be carried out and should carefully constructed maps of a somewhat 
obscure terrain of religious experience be provided, there seem to be no a 
priori reasons why these phenomena couldn’t be investigated scientifically. 
What is crucial, then, is how this type of research is carried out, and this is 
something that future neuroscientific studies can, and should, address system-
atically.
First, the modular hypothesis has to be critically reappraised and prefer-
ably abandoned in favour of a more dynamic and systemic conception of the 
brain. Second, it is essential that neuroscientists become better acquainted 
with their philosophical commitments, especially with the latter’s epistemo-
logical and metaphysical implications. What strikes me as particularly vexing 
is the fact that most authors working in the field of neurotheology seem to 
be completely oblivious of, or only superficially familiar with, the major de-
velopments and dilemmas in the field of philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science. For this reason they operate mostly within a theoretical framework 
of crude (not to say naïve) Cartesian physicalism (Dennett 1991), and if they 
occasionally do happen to stumble across epistemological and/or metaphysi-
cal difficulties, they normally tackle them in an extremely superficial either-or 
fashion (e.g. either God is in the brain or the brain is high on God), with no 
or very little consideration of the proffered philosophical solutions/alterna-
tives to such dilemmas. The same holds true for the fundamental theoretical 
presuppositions about the functioning of the brain: most authors simply pre-
suppose some version of modularism, without any critical assessment of what 
such a supposition entails and why it might seem plausible.
Consequently, little or no thought has been given to alternative ap-
proaches that try to tackle these difficulties head-on. One such proposal, 
which might be of special interest to neurotheology, is neurophenomenology 
(Lutz and Thompson 2003; Rudrauf et al. 2003; Thompson 2007; Varela 
1996). Neurophenomenology was initially put forward by Varela as a direct 
response to Chalmers’ “hard problem”, and provides a tentative methodolog-
ical solution to some philosophical puzzles that the “classical” neurotheology 
fails to address properly. There are at least three reasons why neurophenom-
enology might be of interest to neurotheology.
First, one of the central tenets of neurophenomenology is that expe-
riential and neurobiological data need to be set on equal footing, i.e. that 
systematic and disciplined 1st-person (phenomenological) analyses and 3rd-
person (neurobiological) analyses mutually constrain each other: “Phenom-
enological accounts of the structure of experience and their counterparts in 
cognitive science relate to each other through reciprocal constraints” (Varela 
1996: 343). Thus, from the neurophenomenological perspective, detailed 
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phenomenological accounts are not only a sine qua non of any scientific study 
of religious experience, but they perform the role of structural constraints on 
possible neurobiological accounts. Second, the level of appropriate neurobio-
logical description is not the level of single neural processes or structures, but 
the level of dynamic and transient interconnections between different brain 
regions (Lutz and Thompson 2003: 40–42). Not only is this view much 
more in line with the dynamic and multi-layered picture of the brain that 
has been put forward by recent neuroscientific theories, but it also provides 
a tentative account (“the mutual restraint thesis”) as to why consciousness 
research should be carried out primarily on global (systemic) and not on local 
(modular) level of description.
Third, neurophenomenology is actively engaged with epistemological 
and metaphysical dilemmas that loom large in current philosophy of mind 
and is firmly rooted in an alternative theoretical and pragmatic framework 
called the “4EA approach”7. A detailed account of the 4EA model would 
take us too far afield (see e.g. Kiverstein 2012; Ward and Stapleton 2012), 
but suffice it to say that it actively seeks alternative ways of conceptualizing 
and approaching consciousness that would avoid and/or solve epistemologi-
cal and metaphysical conundrums associated with the mind-body problem. 
Thus, according to the 4EA model, consciousness is not something relegated 
to the “inside” of a human being, i.e. a cognitive mechanism that would 
represent the independent “outside” world, but something that emerges in 
a dynamic interplay between the brain, body, and the world. A living be-
ing, in constituting itself as a living being, enacts its own world, i.e. its own 
field of significance and meaning, and it is against the background of this 
circular (two-way) interaction that consciousness emerges (for further details 
see: Varela et al. 1991; Thompson and Stapleton 2008; Thompson 2007; 
Thompson 2011). This alternative theoretical framework might not only 
provide improved means for conceptualizing experience (especially against 
the background of embodied practices, e.g. meditation, prayer, ritual, etc.), 
but would enable neurotheologians to take seriously and conceptually ap-
proach certain unique features associated with religious experience (e.g. the 
capacity of realizing modes of being and knowing beyond the subject-object 
dichotomy, etc.), as I have argued for elsewhere (Vörös 2013a).
6. Wrapping it All Up
The main aim of this article was to underline some of the gravest shortcom-
ings of current neurotheological models, especially the uncritical acceptance 
7 The name reflects how the model conceives of cognition, namely as extended, embed-
ded, embodied, enactive and affective.
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of the modular hypothesis and the blatant disregard of their underlying epis-
temological and metaphysical presuppositions. This myopia regarding one’s 
own philosophical commitments is the main reason why neurotheology suf-
fers from the same shortcomings and is bound to repeat the same mistakes 
that had brought about the spectacular, yet informative downfall of phrenol-
ogy in the 19th century. And since some of the shortcomings that are explicit 
in neurotheology also pervade, albeit often in a much more subtle manner, 
the neuroscience at large, it is my hope that bringing them out in the open 
might – vibrant fMRI pictures notwithstanding – forestall the unwanted 
and avoidable historic recurrences, and spark a productive discussion on the 
prevalent and alternative frameworks underlying current neuroscientific ap-
proaches.
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